



HELPING NSW BUILD MORE · RESEARCH PAPER · FIRST FINDINGS

The Delivery *Deficit.*

Why NSW approves more homes than it builds

A research initiative of Western Sydney University and Infinikey Consulting

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174k

HOMES COMPLETED IN THE
ACCORD'S FIRST FULL YEAR

Against a required pace of
approximately 240k homes per year

-53%

DECLINE IN CONSTRUCTION
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY

About half as many dwellings
completed per hour worked as 30
years ago (Productivity
Commission).

1 / 12

FIRMS CONSISTENTLY SEEING
THE LIVE COMMERCIAL POSITION

Wave-one result; indicative, not
statistically representative.

NSW can approve housing at scale. The delivery system is not converting it into *homes.*

NSW's housing challenge is increasingly a delivery and conversion problem, not simply a planning or approval problem. The state can approve housing at scale, but the delivery system is not consistently converting that capacity into completed homes. Australia completed approximately 174,000 homes in the Housing Accord's first full year against a required pace of roughly 240,000 per year, a shortfall of around 27 per cent.

The evidence assembled in this study points to an operating-model deficit inside housing delivery firms. Its most visible symptom is a control deficit: leaders often cannot see the live commercial, programme and delivery position of their projects, so risks surface late and intervention arrives after cost and schedule are already affected. The constraint sits downstream of approvals. Build times have lengthened, margins remain thin, and delivery frequently depends on fragmented information and on decisions concentrated in a few senior individuals. External shocks matter, but they do not explain why similar firms achieve materially different outcomes.

Accelerating delivery therefore requires more than approvals, land supply or construction capacity: it requires strengthening the management system that converts approved projects into completed homes. That conversion gap is among the highest-leverage opportunities in the housing agenda.

FIRST FINDINGS AT A GLANCE

01

Execution holds; visibility does not. Nine of 12 firms report their standard process mostly holds; only one of 12 consistently sees the live commercial position.

02

The senior team is the operating system. Nine of 12 route decisions through a senior bottleneck; seven of 12 say outcomes depend on specific individuals.

03

Physical progress is live; commercial truth is retrospective. Site activity is visible in real time; margin, variations and cash exposure are reconstructed afterwards.

04

Growth confidence is low. Only one of 12 firms is confident it could add significant volume without quality deteriorating.

Section 7 extends the analysis to modern methods of construction: *offsite failures show the same operating-model signature, and offsite economics raise the premium on delivery control.*

RESEARCH PROTOCOL

Wave one combined public evidence with primary research involving 12 NSW firms spanning development, head contracting, civil, trade and project management, using a structured questionnaire across four operating-control dimensions (Execution, Visibility, Accountability, Growth-readiness) plus project walk-through interviews testing reported confidence against demonstrated control. The primary evidence is indicative rather than statistically representative.

01 · THE REFRAME

From approval to delivery.

The public debate often frames housing supply as a pipeline problem: planning, land, finance and approvals. Those constraints are real. But the evidence in this study indicates that a second constraint has become strategically important: the ability of delivery businesses to execute the approved pipeline at the required speed, cost and quality.

CORE HYPOTHESIS

The binding constraint is not simply how many projects enter the pipeline. It is how reliably the delivery system converts projects already approved, financed and commenced into completed homes.

This distinction changes the intervention logic. If the constraint were primarily approvals, the response would focus on planning reform and development capacity. If a material part of the constraint sits inside the operating model of delivery firms, the response must also improve project control, commercial visibility, decision rights, information flows and repeatable delivery capability.

02 · THE EVIDENCE

A delivery system under pressure.

2.1 The national delivery gap

The National Housing Accord targets 1.2 million new homes in the five years to June 2029, approximately 240,000 per year. Around 174,000 homes were completed in the first full year, while Master Builders Australia forecasts around 1.03 million homes over the five-year period and the National Housing Supply and Affordability Council projects the target will be reached more than a year late.

The implication is not that the development pipeline is irrelevant. Rather, the conversion rate from pipeline to completed homes has become a critical management question.

2.2 Longer build cycles reduce system throughput

The cited evidence shows substantial increases in construction duration. Detached housing increased from roughly nine months in 2010 to approximately 12.7–12.9 months in 2023–24; apartments increased from approximately 18.5 months to 33.3 months. The most recent year, 2024–25, showed a modest easing (11.5 months for detached houses and 32.9 months for apartments), but durations remain well above those of a decade ago. Longer cycles tie up working capital, increase overhead per home and reduce the number of projects that can be completed from a fixed delivery capacity.

2.3 Thin margins magnify small delivery failures

Industry evidence places typical residential building margins in the low single digits, commonly cited in the 3 to 5 per cent range; the Association of Professional Builders has reported that around three in four small building companies operate on a net profit margin of 3 per cent or less (Association of Professional Builders, 2022). At such margins, apparently small operating losses such as unclaimed variations, rework, schedule drift, procurement leakage or delayed claims can erase project profit.

ILLUSTRATIVE ECONOMICS

A \$5 million project at a 4 per cent margin generates \$200,000 of expected profit. A \$250,000 cumulative leakage from slippage, rework or unclaimed variation is therefore sufficient to eliminate the entire margin. The arithmetic is illustrative; its purpose is to show the sensitivity of low-margin delivery to weak control.

2.4 The fixed-price shock exposed a structural weakness

The 2020–2022 fixed-price contracting period provides a useful stress test. Firms with reliable cost-to-complete visibility could identify margin erosion and change their intake, pricing or delivery plans. Firms without that visibility could continue delivering while the economic position deteriorated, discovering the loss only when the project closed.

The study therefore treats the external shock and the internal control weakness as distinct variables: shocks create risk; operating-model capability determines how early the firm sees, absorbs and responds to that risk.

03 · THE STRUCTURAL DIAGNOSIS

An industry built around projects, not operating systems.

The residential construction sector is highly fragmented. The cited Productivity Commission and CEDA evidence indicates that 98.5 per cent of firms employ fewer than 20 people, the average residential builder employs fewer than two people, and the four largest firms account for only around 12 per cent of the market.

Small scale is not itself a failure. It does, however, create a structural environment in which management layers are thin, systems often reside in individuals, and coordination is assembled project by project across subcontractors, consultants and authorities.

3.1 The operating model is the missing layer

In this report, an operating model means the way a firm actually runs delivery: how work moves from sale to handover; who makes which decisions; what information is available and when; how project, commercial and programme positions are monitored; how cash, claims and cost-to-complete are governed; and whether capability resides in named individuals or in the design of the business.

The critical distinction is between a process and a system. A process may exist on paper. A system produces consistent visibility, accountability and action under live operating conditions.

What the primary research found.

4.1 Wave-one design

Wave one involved 12 NSW firms across development, head contracting, civil, trade and project management. Respondents completed a structured questionnaire covering four dimensions: Execution, Visibility, Accountability and Growth-readiness. Project walk-through interviews were then used to examine how those reported capabilities operated on a real project.

4.2 Finding 1 · Firms are stronger at routine execution than live visibility

Nine of the 12 firms reported that a standard project process mostly or consistently holds. Visibility was materially weaker: only one firm consistently reported seeing the live commercial position of a running project; eight of 12 could not reliably place a project against its programme without chasing information; and none consistently reported that problems surfaced early through the operating system rather than late through crisis.

MANAGEMENT IMPLICATION

The issue is not simply whether work gets done. It is whether leaders know early enough whether the work is producing the expected commercial and programme outcome.

4.3 Finding 2 · The senior team is often the operating system

Nine of 12 firms reported that the senior team is a bottleneck through which decisions are routed. Seven of 12 indicated that project outcomes depend materially on which manager runs the project.

This creates a scalability problem. If delivery capability is held in individuals, adding projects requires adding experienced people. If capability is embedded in decision rights, cadence, information and standard work, the organisation can increase volume without increasing dependence on a small number of heroes.

4.4 Finding 3 · Physical progress is live; commercial truth is retrospective

The interviews identified a recurring asymmetry. Site activity is visible in real time: crews, quantities and physical progress can be observed. The commercial position settles later, after timesheets, materials, supplier invoices, variations and other information have been processed.

The consequence is a lag between operational reality and financial reality. Management may see that a project is moving while not yet seeing whether it is moving profitably.

4.5 Finding 4 · Growth confidence is low

Only one of the 12 firms was consistently confident that it could add significant volume without delivery quality deteriorating. Eight of 12 doubted that their systems and operating cadence would hold under additional projects without simply adding more people.

STRATEGIC TENSION

The sector is being asked to increase output, while many firms do not believe their current operating models can absorb more volume. This creates a structural risk: policy can expand the pipeline faster than the delivery system can scale.

05 · THE CORE DIAGNOSIS

A control deficit caused by an operating-model deficit.

Across the public evidence and wave-one findings, one pattern is consistent: the visible problem is a control deficit, but control is an output of the operating model.

A firm has a control deficit when it cannot reliably answer, during delivery: Where are we against programme? What is the current cost-to-complete? What margin is at risk? Which decisions are overdue? Which issues are likely to become critical? Who has the authority to act? What has been earned but not yet claimed?

When those answers depend on individual effort, spreadsheets, meetings and retrospective reconciliation, the organisation is operating heroically rather than systematically.

06

A delivery maturity model.

DIMENSION	HEROIC DELIVERY	MANAGED DELIVERY	SYSTEMATISED DELIVERY
Visibility	Position reconstructed after the fact	Periodic visibility, often month-end	Live project, programme and commercial position
Decision-making	Routes through individuals	Senior team remains a bottleneck	Clear decision rights and cadence
Problem management	Crisis-driven	Issues tracked periodically	Early signals trigger intervention
Capability	Resides in people	Partly standardised	Embedded in the operating model
Growth	More projects require more heroes	Growth strains management	Volume can scale without proportional dependence on individuals

The maturity model is intended as a diagnostic framework rather than a claim that every firm progresses linearly. Its value is practical: it shifts the conversation from individual performance to organisational design.

07 · THE MMC TEST

Changing the method without changing the model.

If the diagnosis in this paper is correct, it should be visible wherever the delivery system is placed under structural stress. Section 2.4 examined one such stress test in the recent past: the fixed-price contracting period. Modern methods of construction (MMC) provide the forward-looking counterpart. Offsite manufacturing is the principal supply-side response now being mobilised against the delivery gap this paper documents, and it is also the sharpest available test of the operating-model thesis, because it raises, rather than removes, the premium on delivery control.

7.1 The policy bet on offsite construction

Australian governments have converged on prefabricated and modular construction as a primary lever for housing delivery. The Productivity Commission estimates that prefabricated and modular construction can reduce the cost of homes by up to 20 per cent and construction time by up to 50 per cent (as cited by the Australian Building Codes Board, 2025). New South Wales has enacted the Building (Approvals and Practitioners) Act 2026, the first Australian legislation to formally recognise prefabricated construction. The Act establishes a chain of responsibility spanning manufacture, supply, transport, delivery and installation, formalises staged approvals to accommodate factory and site work proceeding on different timelines, and is supported by a \$32.3 million allocation in the 2026-27 NSW Budget, a Modern Methods of Construction Industry Expansion Program inviting manufacturers to invest in NSW, and a state-backed MMC Innovation Facility (NSW Government, 2026a; 2026b; 2026c). Nationally, the ABCB is consulting on a National Voluntary Certification Scheme for Manufacturers of Prefabricated Construction, with the consultation period running to 15 September 2026 and the scheme expected to commence around 2028 (ABCB, 2026; Victorian Government MMC Statement, 2025). An August 2026 Senate committee interim report likewise recommended embracing MMC, supported by pattern books of pre-approved designs (Select Committee on Productivity in Australia, interim report, 2026).

7.2 The failure record: operating-model failures, not product failures

These six cases sit within a broader pattern of financial stress. On data from the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, construction has been the single largest source of company insolvency in Australia every year since 2021-22, accounting for between roughly 24 and 28 per cent of all external administrations. Company failures in the sector reached about 3,600 in 2024-25, and although the count eased slightly in 2025-26, construction remained the largest contributor to insolvency of any industry. The offsite failures examined here are the visible edge of that stress, not exceptions to it. What distinguishes them is that the operating-model weakness is easier to isolate, because the production capability was demonstrably functional at the point of failure.

The policy enthusiasm sits alongside a documented record of offsite business failures, in Australia and internationally, that bears directly on this paper's diagnosis. The table below summarises the most instructive cases. In none of them is the documented cause a failure of the building product. The recurring causes are demand concentration and lumpy order pipelines, factory under-utilisation against high fixed overheads, working-capital structures misaligned with construction progress-payment norms, and financier reluctance to recognise value held in a factory rather than on site.

FIRM	JURISDICTION	YEAR	OUTCOME	DOCUMENTED OPERATING-MODEL CAUSES (AS REPORTED)
Strongbuild	Australia (NSW)	2018	Voluntary administration	Cancellation of a major client project; \$10.5m lending facility fell through; demand concentration
Viridi Group	Australia (NSW)	2024	Voluntary administration; later DOCA	Suspension of a single government-backed contract; working-capital shortfall; single-client pipeline
CLOS	Australia (VIC)	2024	Voluntary administration (May); liquidation (July)	High capital expenses and project cost blowouts; scaling ahead of secured demand
Katerra (intl benchmark)	United States	2021	Chapter 11 bankruptcy	Over-extension across the value chain; cash burn; governance failures despite ~US\$2b raised
Ilke Homes (intl benchmark)	United Kingdom	2023	Administration; ~£320m owed	Factory overhead cash burn; investor withdrawal despite 3,000-home pipeline
L&G Modular (intl benchmark)	United Kingdom	2023	Production ceased; ~£174m cumulative losses	Inability to secure pipeline scale for the factory model

The pattern is consistent across the reporting on these collapses. Strongbuild's managing director attributed that firm's 2018 collapse not to its production capability, which had turned over roughly \$160 million in the prior year with a further \$120 million of work in hand, but to the cancellation of a major client project that caused an arranged \$10.5 million lending facility to fall through (The Fifth Estate; Australian Financial Review, November 2018). Viridi Group, which acquired Strongbuild's plant, entered administration in April 2024 within weeks of the suspension of a single government-backed schools contract, despite producing at a rate of roughly two modular classrooms per week (Built Offsite; The Fifth Estate, 2024). Cross Laminated Offsite Solutions entered administration in May 2024, seven days after publicising plans to scale to 1,000 homes per year (Built Offsite, May 2024). In each case the production capability was demonstrably functional at the point of failure; what failed was the business model around it. The same signature appears in the international benchmarks: Ilke Homes collapsed in the United Kingdom in 2023 owing around £320 million despite a pipeline exceeding 3,000 homes, and Legal & General ceased modular production the same year citing an inability to secure "the necessary scale of pipeline to make the current model work" after cumulative losses of roughly £174 million (Property Week; Bisnow; Construction News, 2023).

7.3 Why offsite raises the price of the control deficit

A project-based builder recovers cost progressively against site milestones and can flex labour when the pipeline thins. A factory cannot. It carries fixed plant, facility and workforce costs that accrue whether or not modules ship, which converts the control deficit described in Section 5 from a margin problem into a solvency problem. The wave-one weaknesses identified in Section 4, retrospective commercial visibility, decision rights concentrated in a small senior group, and low confidence in absorbing additional volume, map directly onto the documented failure causes above. The Productivity Commission's cost and time benefits should therefore be read as a ceiling available to

firms whose operating models can sustain continuous factory throughput, frozen designs and a smoothed demand pipeline, rather than as a default outcome of adopting the method. Changing the construction method does not change the operating model, and the fixed-cost structure of manufacturing punishes an unchanged model faster than site-based delivery does.

7.4 Regulation is converging on the same diagnosis

The design of the emerging certification regime provides independent corroboration. The ABCB's proposed scheme is explicitly systems-based: it assesses the manufacturer's end-to-end systems and processes, including quality management, production controls, workforce competency, traceability, storage, transport and installation procedures (ABCB consultation materials, 2026). The NSW chain-of-responsibility obligations similarly require documented process and accountability at each link from factory to installed building. In substance, these instruments write minimum operating-model standards into regulation. That policy-makers have arrived at a systems-and-process assessment, rather than a product assessment, is consistent with the central finding of this paper: the binding constraint on delivery is organisational, not technical.

RESEARCH IMPLICATION

MMC adoption should be treated, and studied, as an operating-model transition. Readiness is measurable along the same dimensions used in this study, and the recent insolvency record provides a natural comparison set. Section 10 extends the measurement agenda accordingly.

08

What would need to be true.

The research suggests five conditions for operating control:

- **Live visibility:** the commercial and programme position of each active project is visible during delivery, not reconstructed after completion.
- **Early-warning capability:** problems surface through defined signals and routines before they become crises.
- **Clear decision rights:** decisions are allocated by role and cadence rather than routed through a small number of senior individuals.
- **Commercial discipline:** variations, claims, cost-to-complete and cash exposure are captured as part of the delivery system, not recovered from memory.
- **Scalable capability:** the operating model remains effective as project volume, workforce and organisational complexity increase.

These conditions are not presented as a generic transformation checklist. They are the operational implications of the evidence assembled in this first wave.

09

Implications for the NSW housing agenda.

For industry

- Treat operating-model capability as a strategic asset, not an administrative overhead.
- Move from retrospective project reporting to live cost-to-complete, programme and risk visibility.
- Define decision rights so that routine decisions do not become senior-management bottlenecks.
- Standardise the critical delivery cadence while allowing project teams flexibility in execution.
- Build repeatable management capability that survives staff movement and project growth.
- Treat modern methods of construction as an operating-model transition rather than a procurement decision: assess pipeline security, factory-utilisation economics and design-freeze discipline before committing capital to offsite.

For policy and industry bodies

- Broaden the definition of construction capacity beyond workforce and approvals to include delivery-management capability.
- Consider ways to measure delivery capability without creating unnecessary regulatory burden for small firms.
- Support capability-building, digital adoption and management-system maturity alongside planning and supply reforms.
- Create better sector-level visibility of delivery performance so that policy interventions can be evaluated against completed homes, not only approvals or starts.
- Use the emerging prefabrication certification scheme as a capability-building lever as well as a compliance gate. Its systems-based criteria function, in substance, as minimum operating-model standards for manufacturers.

10

Measurement agenda.

The next stage of the research should connect operating-model maturity to objective delivery outcomes. This study identifies the framework proposed by Chandler, Hardie, Perera and Langston (2019) as a useful destination, including measures such as calendar days from project conception to keys, the period from contract award, workforce on site and site waste.

The sequencing matters. A firm that cannot see the live position of its own projects cannot reliably measure its own performance. Establishing operating control is therefore a prerequisite to generating a credible business-as-usual baseline for productivity improvement and modern methods of construction.

A second wave-two stream should extend the framework to firms adopting modern methods of construction, testing whether operating-model maturity predicts factory utilisation, pipeline stability and delivery outcomes among offsite manufacturers and hybrid builders. The recent record of

Australian offsite insolvencies provides a natural comparison set for this stream, and the systems-based criteria of the emerging certification scheme provide a policy-relevant maturity reference against which firms can be assessed.

11

Research methodology.

This study uses a mixed evidence design combining secondary-source analysis with primary qualitative research. The purpose was not to estimate a statistically representative industry prevalence in wave one, but to identify recurring mechanisms, to test the emerging operating-model diagnosis and establish a foundation for subsequent measurement.

11.1 Secondary-source research

The secondary evidence base draws on published Australian national and industry sources, including the Productivity Commission, CEDA, the National Housing Supply and Affordability Council, the Australian Bureau of Statistics, ASIC, Master Builders Australia, the Housing Industry Association, Ai Group and the Association of Professional Builders. International benchmarks include McKinsey Global Institute and Procore. The policy record on modern methods of construction draws on the Australian Building Codes Board, the NSW and Victorian governments, and the Senate Select Committee on Productivity in Australia. The study also draws on Chandler, Hardie, Perera and Langston (2019) for construction-performance measurement.

Sources were selected to triangulate four evidence domains: (1) housing supply and completion performance; (2) construction productivity and project duration; (3) financial and business-failure conditions; and (4) construction-sector operating and performance benchmarks. Public-source findings are used to establish the macro context and to test whether patterns identified in the primary study are consistent with broader sector evidence.

The research team maintains a provenance register for primary materials and a corresponding source register for secondary evidence, recording source organisation, publication date, title, metric or claim used, geographic scope, and the precise location of the supporting evidence. This is particularly important where different sources use different definitions of starts, approvals, completions, project duration or productivity.

11.2 Primary qualitative study

The primary component is an exploratory qualitative study of NSW construction and housing-delivery firms. Wave one comprised 12 firms spanning development, head contracting, civil, trade and project management. The sample was purposive rather than statistically representative: firms were selected to provide variation in delivery role and operating context and to expose the research to different points in the delivery chain.

11.3 Semi-structured project walk-through interviews

The qualitative data collection used semi-structured interviews combined with project walk-throughs. This approach provided a consistent interview structure across firms while allowing respondents to explain how delivery actually works in their organisation and to introduce issues that may not be captured by a fixed questionnaire.

The interview protocol was organised around the following areas:

- Project initiation and handover: how information moves from sale/award into delivery.
- Planning and execution: how programme, resources, subcontractors and dependencies are coordinated.
- Commercial control: how budget, commitments, cost-to-complete, variations, claims, cash and margin are monitored.
- Visibility: what information management can see live, what is delayed, and how the organisation reconciles conflicting versions of project reality.
- Accountability and decision rights: who can decide, what escalates, and where bottlenecks occur.
- Problem detection: how risks and slippage are identified, escalated and resolved.
- Organisational dependence: the extent to which project outcomes depend on particular individuals or managers.
- Growth-readiness: whether the current operating model can support additional project volume without proportional increases in management effort or delivery risk.

Where possible, respondents were asked to walk through a live or recently completed project rather than describe the organisation only in abstract terms. The walk-through allowed the researchers to compare reported practices with demonstrated evidence of how information, decisions and controls operate in practice.

11.4 Questionnaire and interview triangulation

The questionnaire provided a structured self-assessment across Execution, Visibility, Accountability and Growth-readiness. The semi-structured interview then provided contextual and behavioural evidence. The two instruments served different purposes: the questionnaire captured the respondent's stated level of confidence; the interview tested the mechanisms behind that confidence.

This distinction is central to the study. A high self-assessment was not treated automatically as evidence of high operating maturity. Where reported confidence differs from demonstrated visibility or control during a project walk-through, the discrepancy was retained as a finding rather than averaged away.

11.5 Qualitative analysis

Interview material was analysed using a structured thematic-analysis process. First, transcripts and interview notes were coded against the four a priori operating-control dimensions: Execution, Visibility, Accountability and Growth-readiness. Second, inductive coding was used to capture

recurring mechanisms that emerge from the interviews, such as information lag, decision bottlenecks, variation leakage, rework, programme drift, dependence on individuals and fragmented responsibility across delivery interfaces.

The analysis then compared themes across firms and delivery roles. Particular attention was given to negative cases and contradictions, for example, firms that report strong visibility but rely heavily on manual reconciliation, or firms that attribute slippage primarily to external factors while the walk-through reveals internal information or decision delays.

The final analytical step was triangulation: qualitative themes were compared with questionnaire responses and relevant secondary evidence. The objective was not to claim causal proof from a small exploratory sample, but to identify robust patterns and plausible mechanisms that can be tested in later waves.

11.6 Research quality, confidentiality and limitations

Wave-one responses are de-identified. Some questionnaires were collected as hard-copy instruments following the 23 July industry briefing and transcribed verbatim, with a provenance register and source documents held by the research team. Respondent anonymity is maintained where requested.

The principal limitations are sample size, purposive sampling, and reliance on respondent-reported information. The findings should therefore be interpreted as first findings and an emerging explanatory model, not as a statistically representative estimate of the NSW construction industry.

RESEARCH GOVERNANCE

Western Sydney University's role in this project is the interpretation of aggregated findings and preparation of the research report. Participant recruitment, consent and data collection are undertaken independently by Infinikey Consulting, and the University does not access individual-level or potentially re-identifiable participant data.

Future waves should increase the number and diversity of participating firms, standardise objective project-performance measures, and test whether higher operating-model maturity is associated with shorter cycle times, stronger margin control, fewer unresolved variations, lower rework and more reliable programme performance.

12

Conclusion.

The Delivery Deficit reframes the NSW housing challenge around conversion rather than approvals alone. The evidence assembled to date suggests that a significant part of the constraint lies in the operating models through which projects are delivered.

The central distinction is between heroic delivery and systematised delivery. Heroic firms can deliver through experienced people, effort and intervention. Systematised firms make delivery visible, govern decisions through clear rights and cadence, surface problems early and retain capability as projects and people change.

BOTTOM LINE

NSW's delivery capacity is not determined only by how many projects are approved or how many workers are available. It is also determined by whether the businesses responsible for delivery can see, decide and act while there is still time to change the outcome.

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WHAT COMES NEXT

The research *continues.*

TAKE PART IN WAVE TWO

Builders, developers and housing providers delivering homes in NSW who would like to take part in the next wave, or receive future findings, can contact Malik Asad Ali at malik@infinikeyconsulting.com.au or Dr Nassim Aissa Belbaly at n.belbaly@westernsydney.edu.au.

INDUSTRY BRIEFING · 30 SEPTEMBER 2026

The findings are presented and discussed with a senior industry panel at a briefing in Sydney on 30 September 2026. Details and registration: infinikeyconsulting.com.au/research/the-delivery-deficit

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